This study examines the roles of revenue recycling schemes for the selection of alternative tax instruments (i.e., carbon-, sulphur-, energy-and output-tax) to reduce CO, emissions to a specified level in Thailand. A static, single period, multi-sectoral computable general equilibrimn (CGE) model of the Thai economy has been developed for this purpose. This study fmds that the selection of a tax instrument to reduce CO, emissions would be significantly influenced by the scheme to recycle the tax revenue to the economy. If the tax revenue is recycled to finance cuts in the existing labour or indirect tax rates, carbon tax would be more efficient than the sulphur-, energy-and output-taxes to reduce CO 2 emissions. On the other hand, if the tax revenue is recycled to households through a lump-sum transfer, sulphur and carbon taxes would be more efficient than energy and output taxes. The ranking between the sulphur and carbon taxes under the lump sum transfer scheme depends on substitution possibility of fossil fuels. Sulphur tax is found superior over carbon tax at the higher substitution possibility between fossil fuels; the reverse is found true at the lower substitution possibility. In all schemes of revenue recycling considered, the output tax is found to be the most costly (i.e., in welfare terms) despite the fact that it generates two to three times higher revenue than the other tax instruments.
INTRODUCTION
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There are a number of alternative tax instruments for reducing atmospheric emissIons such as carbon dioxide (CO,), sulphur dioxide (S02), oxides of nitrogen (N0J. Among them, the more common are environmental taxes (e.g., carbon-and sulphur-tax), energy (or Btu) tax and output tax. Carbon and sulphur taxes are levies on fossil fuels in proportionate to contents of carbon and sulphur, respectively. An energy tax is applied in proportionate to heat contents of a fuel, whereas the output tax here is defmed as a levy on the output of a good or service in proportionate to CO 2 emissions released during its production. Existing studies, such as Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) , Coulder (1994) and Schmutzler and Coulder (1997) , have compared different taxes for the purpose of reducing environmental pollution. Coulder (1994) shows that an energy tax is less efficient than an income tax to generate the same amount of revenue. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) fmds, among carbon-, energy-and output-taxes for reducing CO 2 emission, that the adverse impacts of the tax on the economy is the lowest in the case of carbon tax and highest in the case of the output tax. \Xlh.i.le comparing economic impacts of different tax instruments to reduce CO 2 emissions, existing studies (e.g., Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993 and Coulder, 1994) consider only a particular scheme for recycling tax revenue' instead of considering alternative schemes of revenue recycling. A question may arise as to whether a carbon tax is always more efficient (i.e., in welfare terms) than other taxes (e.g., sulphur, energy and output taxes) to reduce CO, emissions irrespective of schemes to recycle the tax revenue. While an output tax is relatively 1110te expensive than a carbon tax for reducing the salne level of CO 2 etnissions, it generates higher revenue than the carbon tax Oorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993 and Coulder, 1994 ).
An important issue often neglected in the environmental tax literature is the strong interlinkage between the carbon and sulphur taxes. A carbon tax reduces not only CO 2 emission but also emissions of odler pollutants (e.g., S02. NOj. This is because a carbon tax would reduce demand for fossil fuels, particularly coal and oil, which are also the primary sources of SO, and NO, emissions. Similarly, sulphur tax reduces not only SO, but also CO, and NO, emissions. A question would then arise as to what extent carbon and sulphur taxes complements to each other in meeting their objectives. Could a sulphur tax be more efficient than a carbon tax to reduce CO 2 emissions? If yes, would dle results be sensitive to revenue recycling schemes? Interestingly, our analysis shows dlat, in dle case of Thailand, sulphur tax could be more preferable dlan carbon tax to reduce CO, emission when the tax revenue is recycled to households through a lump sum transfer. This is mainly because of the use of low quality coal (i.e., high sulphur content and low heat value) which accounts for about one third of total fossil fuel based energy consumption in the country.
The paper contributes into the literature in two fronts. First, it compares alternative environmental tax instmments under alternative revenue recycling schemes, which is different from the existing practice of ranking of tax instruments under a particular scheme of tax revenue recycling. Secondly, it examines complementarities between sulphur and carbon taxes to reduce CO, emissions. It furdler investigates sensitivities of the carbon and sulphur tax relationship, first to tax revenue recycling schemes, and second to various degree of substitution possibility between energy commodities. The study considers four different tax instruments (i.e., carbon-, sulphur-, energy-and output-tax) and dlree alternative schemes for recycling tax revenue'. The revenue recycling schemes considered here are: (i) recycling the tax revenue to households through a llUnp SlUn transfer (hereafter "Scheme 1"), (il) using it to fmance cuts in existing labour tax rate (hereafter "Scheme 2") and (iii) using it to fmance cuts in existing inclirect tax rates of non-energy goods 01ereafter "Scheme 3").
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the computable general equilibrimn model developed for the purpose of the study followed by the presentation of data and model parameters. Section 4 presents results from the simulations of the main analysis while Section 5 presents d1e results of sensitivity analyses. Finally, the conclusions and fmal remarks are presented.
THE CGE MODEL
The model developed here is a static, single period, multi-sectoral computable general equilibrimn model of the Thai economy. In this section, we present approaches and assmnptions used to model various economic agents, such as producers, households, government and foreign sectors.
Production sector
The economy is disaggregated into 21 production sectors of which 6 are energy sectors (see Table 1 ). Production behaviour of each sector is represented by nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions. This is along the lines of some existing studies (e.g., Bohringer and Rutherford, 1997; Capros et aI., 1997 and Bovernberg and Goulder, 1996) . The model developed here, however, differs from existing ones while representing the electricity sector. First, the electricity sector is divided into seven sub-sectors based on technologies used for electricity generation. This allows the substitution possibilities between various technologies used for electricity generation. Most existing studies, in contrast, treat electricity sector as a single technology thereby restricting such substitution possibilities. Secondly, the nested CES structure used for the electricity sector differs from those used in the rest of the sectors to allow direct substitution between capital and fuel in the electricity generation industry. Our model considers the gross output of the electricity sector as aCES function of the capital-fuel composite and the labour-material-electricity composite in contrast to the existing practice of treating it as a function of primary factor composite (i.e., a composite of capital and labour) and the aggregate intermediate input.
Figures 10 and 1b present the nested production stmctures, respectively for the electricity sector and other sectors.
As can be seen from these figures, for all sectors except electricity generation, gross output (XD) is a CES function of the primary factor composite (PF) and the aggregate intermediate input (Z). CES refers to a constant clasticity of substitution flu1Ctional form and CD refers to it Cobb-Douglas functional form, XD represents gross output, PF and Z refer to the primary factor composite and the aggregate intennediate commmption; K, I. . . , E and TvfT refer to capital, laboUl", the aggregate energy conswnptioll and the aggregate material consumption; F, EL and 1vl refer to fuel, electricity and material. Similarly, KF, Li\IJ~J, and rvlTEL refer to the capital fuel composite, the labour, material, electricity composite and the mmcrial and electricity composite.
In the electricity sector, gross output is a CES function of the capital-fuel composite (KF) and the labom-material-electricity composite (LMEL). The gross output is expressed as foll')\\"$:
(1) XDj = [a JlGrrz .PF(G;FZ-] 
where a pF and a z represent scaling factors for PF and Z, respectively and crl'l/ is the elasticity of substitution between PF and Z. In the electricity sector PF, Z, apc> a z and cr""1 are respectively replaced by KF, LMEL, a KF (i.e., scaling factor for KF), a WEL (i.e., scaling factor for LMEL) and cr""WEL (i.e., elasticity of substitution between KF and LMEL). PF, KF, Z and LMEL are derived as follows:
xdp' pFZ (3) PF; = a XD;.(--')G, The dual functions of Equation 1 and 2 give the unit cost of production as follows:
i :;t: electricity· sector g = electricity sub-sector
In the similar manner for Equations 3 to 6, all other demand variables presented in the subsequent tiers of the nested structures in Figs. 1a and 1b are derived except for the material inputs (MJ. In the case of material input, the Cobb-Douglas functional form is considered, mainly due to a lack of substitution elasticities among the material inputs'. The demands for material input in production sector i (Mk.J and electricity sub-sector g (J'vl k .J are derived as follows:
:' > Despite an exhaustive literature survey, elasticity of substitution between materials could not be found for economies similar to Thailand; hence, we could not use CES functional form to model demands for material goods. Instead, we used Cobb-Douglas fWlCtional form that assmnes unitary elasticity of substitution; which is a limitation. Nevcltheless, the use of Cobb-Douglas [I.Uletional form is common in CGE modeling.
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MTj.rntpj where, MT, and MT, are the aggregate material input in sector i and electricity sub-sector g, respectively; mtp is th~price of MT; gpk is the price of good k, indt k is indirect tax rate of good k and (X is the share parameter. The price variables corresponding to all tiers except tier for material aggregation are derived in the similar manner for Equations 7 to 8. The prices of aggregate material input in production sectors i (mtp) and electricity sub-sectors g (mtp,J, are derived as follows:
The electricity sector is disaggregated into nine sub-sectors as shown in Fig. 2 . The total electricity output (XDEL) at the highest tier in the figure is a CES aggregate of hydro electricity (XDm.) and thermal electricity (XDTrJ and can be expressed as: (13) where a Hy and am are scaling factors and U BT is elasticity of substitution between hydro and thermal electricity. In the similar manner for Equations 3 to 6, XD m · and XD m are derived as follows: All demand variables presented in Figure 2 are derived in the similar manner for Equations 14 and 15, while all corresponding price variables are derived in the similar manner for Equation 16.
Household sector
This study considers a representative household that follows a five-step hierarchical optimisation process to maximise its utility (see Figure 3) .' At the top of the hierarchy, the representative household trades off between savings (or future consumption) and the present consumptions while maximising utility (U), which is represented as follows:
4 A similar approach has been used in a number of existing general equilibrium models (e.g., Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993a; Bahringer and Rutherford, 1997; Shoven and Wballey, 1992 and Ballard et aI., 1985) . ;, The present consumption is the aggregation of goods, services and leisure consumed. According to Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993.a) , tills is also referred to as full consumption.
(17) 
Most general equilibrium models are found to use Hicksian equivalent vanation to measure welfare in1pact of policy change (e.g., Ballard et a1. 1985 , Capros et a1. 1997 Zhang, 1997) . Hicksian equivalent variation is defined as the additional income necessary to obtain a new utility level at the old pl-ice. In terms of monetary value, the equivalent variation (EV) due to a policy shift can be expressed as follows:
where U" and UO are household utilities after and before the policy change, respectively; and upo is the price of utility before the policy change. Note here that the welfare effect does not account for the welfare in1provements due to mitigation of carbon and sulphur emissions.
In the same manner for Equations 18 and 19, household demand for goods and services (C) and leisure (LS) are derived from tier 2 of the nested structure in Fig. 3 . Similarly, the household consumption of the aggregate material good (HMT) and the aggregate energy good (HEN) are derived from the third tier, followed by derivation of household demand for electricity (CH EL ), the fossil fuel aggregate (HF) at tier 4. At the bottom tier, household demand for fuels, CHi (i.e., f = coal, oil, gas and fuel wood), are derived in the similar manner.
The household demands for individual material, CH k (see right hand side of tier 4 in Fig. 3 ) are derived by using a Cobb-Douglas functional form as follows:
where hmtp is the price of aggregated consumption of material goods in households, gpk is the price of material good k.
The price variables corresponding to demand variables in Fig. 3 are derived in the similar manner for Equation 21, except for hmtp, which is given as follows: Total household income consists of capital income, labour income and the net transfer from the rest of the world. Capital income also includes depreciation. Labour income consists of not only salary and wages but also social security benefits to household. Total household income (THI) is expressed as follows:
where kp is net capital price, T K and ,L are capital tax rate and labour tax rate respectively, and NTRH is the net transfer from the rest of the world to the household and expressed as a fixed portion of total export demand as follows:
with a"TRI'I as a ratio of NTRH to exports in the base case. Household mcome IS subjected to income tax (ITAX), which is given as follows:
Disposable income of the household (DI) is total household income less income tax paid by the household and is given by:
The government sector
\'(/hile modeling the government sector, we assume that government consumption does not provide any utility to private consumers. This approach is COl11l11only employed in several general equilibrium studies (e.g., Ballard et. al 1985; Capros et aJ. 1997; Zhang, 1997) '. Govemment collects tax, consumes public goods, saves part of its income and receives transfers from the rest of the world'-Total government revenue (GI) consists of indirect tax paid by firms, direct tax paid by households, import duty and net transfers from the rest of the world (NTRG), and is given as follows:
where G and G" are total domestic demand and import demand, mp import price and impt is import duty. Net transfer from the rest of the world to the government is maintained at a fixed fraction of total exports as given below:
NTRG as a ratio of NTRG to exports in the base case and kept fn:ed in the simulation cases as well. Government income is allocated to public consumption and government savings. The government consumption of good i (CG) is kept the same as before the introduction of the carbon tax (i.e., CGo). Government saving (SAVG) is the difference between the total government income and the total government consumption, i.e.,
Foreign trade
Import demand: Following Armington (1969), we assume domestically produced and imported goods to be imperfect substitutes. The total demand for a good G, is assumed to be a CES composite of its domestic components (Go) and imported components (G") and expressed as follows:
where aD' and a,,, are scaling factors of GO, and G",; and aDM, is the elasticity of substitution between GO, and G'':. GO, and G'" are derived as follows:
(33) (34) where gpi is the price of the composite of domestically produced and imported good i, and mpi is the price of imported good i. The dual function of Equation 32 is used to derive gpi and it is given as follows:
\Vith the assumption of small economy, the price of imported good is given by
where, gpw, is the world price of good i, and ER is the exchange rate. Note that gpw, and ER are exogenous (and fL'<ed) in this study.
Export demand: Following a number of studies (e.g., Dervis et aL 1982; 'il7halley, 1992, Capros et aL, 1997; Naqvi, 1998) , the model considers an explicit export demand function as follows:
(37) EX j =aEX(gpwj.ER)£; 1 xdpi where, a,EX is the share of good i in total export demand and '" is the price elasticity of exported goodS i; (i.e., elasticity of export good i with respect to the world price). This export demand function is derived assuming that the world as a whole behave in a manner similar to the single countl)' modeled and consumes products according to rules of cost minimization subject to the generalized CES formulation that specifies composite world commodities (Dervis et aL 1982) 9 Our model rules out the possibility of direct exporting of the imported goods [i.e., "cross-hauling" (Shoven and \'Vhalley, 1992)].
Investment Demand
The model considers that the total current investment demand in an economy is equal to the total delivery of investment goods to the economy in the previous year. The current investment demanded by the sector i (INV) is given as follows:
where, invp; is price of investment in sector i; 'ir', 'dpr' and 'gr' are interest rate, depreciation rate and growth rate of sectoral production, respectively. Though rate of depreciation and production growth rates can val)' across the sectors, the model assumes them the same for all the sectors. The model assumes an optimal capital price, which is linked to the price of investment as follows:
Delivel)' of investment good i (INVD) is assumed to be a fixed share of total investment goods delivered to the economy.
where, ANINV, is the share of investment demanded by sector i ill total investment demand.
8 As a price elasticity of demand is negative, f; in fact is the negative of the price elasticity of export.
' ) Some general equilibrium models developed for developing countries (c.g., Zhang, 1997; Xie 1996) have used an export supply fWlction by using a constant elasticity of transfonuation (eET) function for this purpose. However, tIus requires estimation of additional parameters. Hence, this study models the export demand fW1ction instead of an export supply function.
Market clearing
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Good market clearing: Total production of good i is the sum of d1e domestic consumption of domestically produced good and exported good. Inventory demand for good i (STK;) is maintained as a fned fraction of output from sector i before and after the carbon tax. (43) where a,ST" is the ratio of the stock of good i to its production in the base case, and it is kept fned in the policy simulations cases as well.
Factor markets clearing:
It is assumed that total time endowment (i.e., the active population) in the economy does not change due a policy change. This assumption implies that the total labour supply to the economy depends on ilie wage rate and labour supply elasticity. Following the Walrasian approach, it is assumed iliat the total labour supply (TLS) in the economy is equal to the total demand of labour in the economy. This gives us d1e following relationship: (44) TLS= 2>j =TTE-LS J where TIE is the total time endowment of d1e work force in the economy and LS is the leisure demand. This implies that people who are legally eligible to work spend their time either working or consuming leisure.
The model allows capital mobility across the production sectors. However, the total capital stock (TK) in the economy is assumed to be unchanged as a result of a policy change. This implies the following relationship:
Current Balance: The difference between total value outflow (e.g., imports of goods and services) from the country to the total value inflow (e.g., exports and transfers from the rest of the world) to the country is defmed as the current balance (TBAL) and is expressed as:
Macroeconomic balance: Total investment is ti,e sum of total savings comprising of household saving, government saving and the current balance. This balance is an identity reflecting ti,e Waltas law and this equation is not necessary to solve ti,e model.
(47) S.invp+SAVG+TBAL= LONVDj.+STKj).gpj J
Emission estimation
Emissions of a pollutant p from sector n (POL"." wiili P = CO" SO, and NOJ can be estimated as follows:
(48) POLn,p = LFFr,n.cr.efr,p r where n represents 20 industrial sectors (except ilie electricity sector), the household sector and ilie government sector; FFr." refers to use of fossil fuel f (in monetary unit) in sector n; c', converts FF, to energy unit (e.g., GJ) and can be expressed as GJ/$; and ef,." is ilie emission factor of pollutant p for fuel f, expressed in kg of pollutant per GJ unit fuel consumption (i.e., kg/GJ). Emissions of a pollutant p from electricity sub-sector g (POL,.,,) (P = CO" SO, and NOJ can be estimated as follows: (49) where XD g is electricity generation from technology type g (in monetary unit), c g . converts XD g to energy unit (i.e., GWh) and ef g ." is ilie emission factor of pollutant p for generation technology g expressed in ton of pollutant per GWh electricity generation. Total emission of pollutant p from ilie electricity sector (pOL,,,,, with n = electricity sector) is given 
Policy Simulation
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Introduction ofnew tax instruments: The new tax, etaxl' (representing carbon tax if p is CO, and sulphur tax if p is SO,) is exogenous to the model. Based on the given level of an environmental tax, an equivalent indirect tax (envt) is calculated as follows:
where, POLo,., is emission of pollutant p from total consumption of fuel f in the country in the base case (i.e., before the introduction of an environmental tax). Note also dlat fuel wood is exempted from the environmental tax , meaning that a carbon or sulphur tax is applied ollh to fossil fuels in Equation 52, whereas the output tax is applied to all goods and sen'ice, ill E'juation 54. The carbon and sulphur taxes are direct taxes as they apply to onh' fossil fuels in proportionate to their carbon and sulphur contents. On the other hand, the output taxes are indirect taxes and they are applied to all goods and services in proportionate to the release of CO, emissions during their production. In order to generate output tax rates, an arbitrary carbon tax rate, etaxl' (US$ per ton of carboll emission) is used. The value of etaxl' is changed until the required output tax rates are generated to meet the emission reduction target (here 10% of CO, reduction).
The new indirect tax rate (indt/'E\') is the sum of indt and envt, i.e., (55) jndtfEW =jndt~+ envti°°! TAX where jndt i =°G i ·gPi indt O , is the indirect tax rate of good i in the base case, which was calibrated as the ratio of total indirect tax paid by the good (ITAXO) to the total sales of the good in the economy.
Revenue recycling: Three schemes for recycling tax revenue are considered in the study. The government saving is calculated again by using Equation 58.
DATA AND PARAMETERS
A social accOllllting matri,,, (SAM) of Thailand for year 1990 constructed by Timilsina and Shrestha (2002) was used for this study. The SAM is based on the Input-Output (I/O) Tables (NESDB, 1993) and National Accounts of Thailand (NESDB, 1991) . The detailed infonnation in relation to the various electricity generating industries are presented in Appendix A.
The main parameters used in the model include price elasticity of exports (Tj) and elasticities of substitution between (i) the primary factor composite and the aggregate intermediate input (cr PEZ ), (ii) capital and labour (cr KL ) , (iii) the energy aggregate and the material aggregate (crE'n), (iv) the fuel aggregate and electricity (crEEL), (v) domestically produced and imported goods (cr o ",) and (vi) individual fuels (crEE). The values of these parameters are based on existing studies and presented in Table 1 .
Elasticities of substitution between electricity generated from different technologies are presented in Table 2 . Table 3 .
Sources: Behringer and Rutherford (1997); Jemio and Jansen (1993); Goulder (1994) ; Ro'e ami I.", It ')<)0): Welsch (1998) and Zhang (1997) 
0.4
Among electricity generated from steam turbine, combined cycle and gas turbine (CCGT) and intemal combustion (1C) cngine (a TH ) 0.5
Among electricity generated from coal-fired, oil-fired and gas-fired steam turbine technologies (as')
0.6
Between electricity generated from oil-fired and gas-fired CCGT technologies (crC G ) 0.8 Sources: Welsch (1998) , Naqvi (1998) and Zhang (1997) . The elasticities of substitution between (i) the capital factor composite and the labommaterial-electricity composite (aKFL'lEL), (il) capital and fuel (a KF ) , labom and the materialelecu-icity composite (a UlEL ) and (iv) the aggregate material and electricity (a mEl ) are presented in Table 3 . In the household sector, the elasticity of substitutions between present consumption (i.e., consumption of goods and leisme) and savings; and the consumption of goods and leisme are calibrated following Ballard et aL (1985) .
Results from the simulations
Tax rates required for reducing CO 2 ell1ission to the specifiedlevel
In this study we have simulated economic and environmental impacts of reducing CO, emissions by 10% from the base case lO through the introduction of each of the carbon-, sulphm-, energy-and output-tax options. The rates of each of these tax instruments required for reducing CO, emission by 10% from the base case and their equivalent fuel and indirect tax rates were also determined from the simulation. These are presented in Tables 4(a) to 4(d).
As can be seen from the tables, the burden of sulphm tax mainly falls on coaL The equivalent fuel (or energy) tax rate of the sulphm tax on coal would be more than twice as high as that of the carbon and energy taxes for reducing the same amount of CO 2 emission. The sulphm tax would increase the after-tax price of coal by 299% to 332%, whereas carbon and energy taxes increase the coal price by 107% to 132%. This is due mainly to the low heating value and high sulphur content of coal used in Thailand. The burden of energy tax on oil is higher than that of the carbon and sulphur taxes. Note that, for each type of tax (i.e., carbon-, output-, energy-and sulphur-tax), the tax rate would vary with the revenue recycling schemes. In order to reduce the same level of CO, emissions, the required tax rates are found to be higher under the revenue recycling Scheme 3 (i.e., when the tax revenue is recycled to fInance cuts in indirect taxes on non-energy goods) than those under the other schemes of revenue recycling. On the other hand, the required tax rate is found to be smallest under the revenue recycling Scheme 1 (i.e., when the tax revenue is recycled to household through a lump-sum transfer).
If an output tax is imposed in proportionate to the carbon intensity of a good or service (i.e., money value of total production of the good or service from a sector divided by total carbon emission released from the sector), some sectors, especially the fuel intensive ones (i.e., power and transport), would face higher tax rates than others. In order to reduce national CO, emission by 10% from that in the base case, the required output tax rates would be as high as 52% to 69% for electricity and 14% to 18% for transport services in Thailand.
Impacts ofthe alternative tax instrnments on economic welfare"
The impacts of the alternative tax instrlltnents on economic welfare are presented in Fig.  4 . As can be seen from the figure, among the tax instruments considered, the output tax would result in the highest welfare loss under each of the revenue recycling schemes. This is because while carbon-and sulphur-taxes affect the sources of emissions (i.e., conslltnption of fossil fuels) directly, the output tax affects indirectly. A tax instrlltnent that affects sources of emissions indirectly is inefficient as compared to that affects directly (Cropper and Oates, 1992; Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993; Schmutzler and Goulder, 1997) . The study reveals an interesting relationship between carbon and sulphur taxes while reducing CO, emissions. A sulphur tax applied to reduce 10% of CO, emissions was found to reduce 20% of SO, reduction from the base case. Moreover, the sulphur tax was found slightly efficient even than the carbon tax to reduce CO, emission when the tax revenue is recycled to households through a hllnp-Slltn transfer (i.e., Scheme 1). A question can, however, arise: why should the sulphur tax be more efficient than tlle carbon tax to reduce CO, emission when the tax revenue is recycled through a llltnp-sunl transfer to households? An intuitive reason behind this is that the excess burden of SO, tax falls mainly on coal, which has a limited use in the economy (mainly for power generation). This implies that the regressive impacts of SO, tax get distributed to the economy to a lower extent than the regressive inlpacts of CO, tax do.
To clarify further why SO, tax burden falls mainly on coal, we need to look at the quality of coal used in Thailand. Ninety eight percent of coal used in Thailand is lignite, which has 11 Impacts on all key economic variables such as economic welfare, GDP, gross output, fInal and intennediate demand, imports, exports, current balance have been analyzed. However, only impact on economic welfare has been presented here for the purpose of this paper. Interested readers could request more detailed results from the authors.
high sulphur content (i.e., 5.5%) and low heat value (i.e., 11MJ/kg) (DEDP, 2000) . The sulphur content of coal in Thailand is about five times as high as that of oil (i.e., the weighted average value of all petroleum products used in Thailand) while the carbon content of coal is about 1.5 times that of oil for the same amount of heat release. This clearly implies that the sulphur tax would cause a larger reduction in coal consumption than an equivalent carbon tax. Our model results show that a SO, tax introduced to reduce CO, emission by 10% from the baseline causes demand for coal to decrease by 47%, whereas a CO, tax for the same purpose causes demand for coal to decrease by 29%. Moreover, the SO, tax causes demand for natuxal gas to increase by 4% as natuxal gas, a fuel with negligible sulphur contents, becomes relatively cheaper with the sulphur tax as compared to coal and petroleum products. The CO, tax on the other hand causes demand for natuxal gas to decrease by 13%. Note that the base year of the CGE model used for this analysis is 1990. Sulphur control technologies were not used in Thailand in 1990. If sulphur control technologies existed, the capital costs of the industries employing sulphur control technologies would have been higher than that taken in the study~.e., in the absence of sulphur control technologies). It is also possible to model sulphur control technologies and sulphur tax under the CGE in the similar manner as Conrad and Schmidt (1998) , Edwards and Hutton (1999) modeled emission abatement technologies. This could be an area of further extension of the study. This analysis has, however, an explicit objective of examining effects of carbon-and sulphur-energy-and output-taxes in reducing CO, emissions in an environment where no control technologies exists for reducing carbon and sulphur emissions and where electricity sector (i.e., one of the main sources of emissions) uses a low quality coal (i.e., lignite) for power generation).
The increase of natural gas demand due to sulphur tax implies that coal would be replaced \N-ith natuxal gas when a sulphur tax is introduced. One might wonder would the result (i.e., sulphur tax is more efficient than a carbon tax to reduce CO, emissions when tax revenue is recycled to households through a lump-sum transfer) holds, if the substitution possibility between fossil fuels is small in the short-run? To answer this query, we conducted a sensitivity analysis reducing elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels. If elasticities of substitution between fossil fuels are lowered by 25%, the result does not hold. The welfare loss of sulphur tax is now slightly higher than that of the carbon tax (please Table 6 in Section 5). In practice, however, there exists a high substitution possibility between coal and natuxal gas in Thailand. This is because coal and gas are used mainly for power generation in the country. In the absence of a sulphur tax, gas is used for mainly peaking generation and tl1e utilization of gas fired power plants is low. If a sulphur tax is introduced, natuxal gas now becomes relatively cheaper than coal. Existing gas-fired power plants could now be run for longer hours than before (increased utilization factor). Hence, the fmding that sulphur tax would be more efficient than carbon tax in reducing CO, emissions when tax revenue is recycled to households through a lump-sum transfer holds true in Thailand.
A sulphur tax can be considered an effective instrument in reducing CO, emissions in Thailand for two reasons. First it reduces SO, emission significantly higher than a carbon tax does (please see Table 5 ). Secondly, it could be less regressive than a carbon tax to reduce CO, emission. Most importantly, it could be an effective policy tool to reduce CO, emissions in countries like Thailand, which does not have binding obligation to reduce CO, emission but has been seriously affected by SO, emission. In such situation, SO, tax could be a policy choice as it reduces the local air pollution (e.g., SO,) and also reduces CO, emission at almost the same level an equivalent carbon tax does.
The efficiency of a tax instrmnent is significantly influenced by the scheme of recycling tax revenue. When the revenues are recycled to fmance cuts in either labour tax rate (Scheme 2) or indirect tax rates of non-energy goods (Scheme 3), the carbon tax is fOlUld to be tlle most efficient instrument for reducing CO, emission to tlle specified level. The sulphur tax is fOlli1d to be more costly than not only the carbon tax but also the energy tax when the tax revenues are recycled to fmance cuts in indirect tax rates of non-energy goods.
The reason for this is as follows: when the tax revenues are recvcled to households in a lump-sum manner tllere would be only the tax-interaction effect, but not the revenue recycling effect".
On the other hand, the revenue recycling would have a significant effect on economic welfare when the tax revenues are recvcled to fmance cuts in either the labour tax rate or indirect tax rates of non-energy goods· (Schemes 2 and 3)13. Note also that the tax revenue from tlle sulphur tax would be smaller than that from the carbon tax as the former affects only coal and a few petroleum products (e.g., diesel and fuel oil), whereas the latter affects all types of fossil fuels (i.e., coal, gas and oil). Since, carbon tax revenue is higher tllan the sulphur tax revenue for reducing the same level of CO, emission, the revenue recycling effect of the carbon tax on welfare would be higher than that of the sulphur tax. Hence, the carbon tax would cause a smaller welfare loss than the sulphur tax to achieve a particular level of CO, emission reduction when tlle tax revenues are recycled to fmance cuts in eitller labour tax rate or indirect tax rates of non-energy goods. Altllough tax revenues lli1der the output tax would be 2 to 3 times higher than that lli1der the carbon-and sulphur-taxes, the revenue recycling effect would not be enough to significantly offset the tax interaction effects in tlle case of tlle output tax. As a result, there would be higher welfare loss due to the output tax.
Although the output tax is inefficient as compared to carbon-, sulphur-and energy-taxes to reduce CO, emissions, this type of tax instrmnent could be useful to penalize production of carbon intensive goods from indust11alized colli1tries not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol (Goh, 2004) . For example, output tax imposed on U.S. and Australian goods by European cOlli1tries, Japan and Canada could help reduce CO, emissions to some extent.
Note that the energy tax would result in a higher welfare cost than the carbon-and sulphur-taxes lli1der each of the revenue recycling schemes, except when the tax revenues are recycled to fmance cuts in indirect tax rates of non-energy goods (Scheme 3). This is because, for a particular level of CO, emission reduction, there would a proportionately higher rise in prices of relatively low carbon content fuels (i.e., oil and gas) lli1der an energy tax than that lli1der the carbon-and sulphur-taxes. Consequently, the energy tax would cause more economic distortions tllan the carbon and sulphur taxes for reducing the same level of CO, emission. Similar findings are also reported by some existing studies [See e.g., Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) and Goulder (1994) ]. However, it is interesting to note here that, in order to reduce tlle same level of CO, emission, there would be a smaller welfare loss lli1der the energy tax than that lli1der the sulphur tax when tax revenue is used to fmance indirect tax rates of non-energy goods. This is because the revenue recycling effect of the energy tax on welfare would be higher than that of the sulphur tax when the tax revenues are recycled to finance 12 According to Parry et al. (1999) , when an environmental tax is introduced in a system where distortionary taxes are already present (i.e., the second best setting), it would further increase the tax distortions thereby producing a negative welfare impact; the effect is tenned as the tax interaction effect. If the revenue generated from the new tax is recycled to finance cuts in pre-existing distortionary tax rates, it would cause positive welfare impacts; this effect is termed as revenue-recycling effect. 13 This is why welfare loss is lower undet" the revenue recycling Schemes 2 and 3 than that under Scheme 1. cuts in indirect taxes on non-energy goods.
IMPACTS ON S02 AND NO x EMISSIONS
43
The impacts of different tax instruments on SO, and NO, emissions under alternative revenue recycling schemes are presented in Table 5 . As can be seen from the table, there are two interesting fmdings. First, different tax instruments for reducing the same level of CO, emission would have significantly different impacts on SO, and NO, emissions. Secondly, for a given tax instrument, environmental impacts (i.e., impacts on SO, and NO,) do not vary significantly across alternative revenue recycling schemes. The output tax aiming to reduce CO, emissIOn by 10% would reduce SO, and NO, emissions by about 12% and 9% respectively. On the other hand, the sulphur tax introduced for the same purpose (i.e., to reduce CO, emission by 10%) would reduce SO, and NO, emissions by about 21% and 10% respectively. In terms of environmental impacts, the sulphur tax would be the best tax instrument in Thailand, as it would cause higher SO, and NO, emission reductions than other tax instruments under each of the revenue-recycling scheme considered.
For a given tax instrument, percentage reductions in emissions (i.e., SO, and NO,) are not found varying significantly across the revenue recycling schemes. For example, the energy tax would reduce SO, emission by 12.14% when tax revenue is recycled to households through a lump-sum transfer. The corresponding reductions would be 12.48% if revenue is recycled to fmance cuts in existing indirect tax rates of non-energy goods.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Since the difference in percentage welfare impacts between carbon and sulphur tax cases is very smail (i.e., 0.01 %), particularly when tax revenue is recycled to households as a lumpsum transfer and when the tax revenue is used to fmance cuts in labour tax rates, sensitivity analysis is necessary. As there are more than 180 elasticity parameters used in the study, the number of possible sensitivity analyses could be too large. Hence, only selected parameters were considered for sensitivity analysis.
In the nested structure of production or household utility function, the elasticities at the h.igher tiers may have larger effects than that at lower tires. Therefore, the sensitivity analyses are conducted on the elasticities of substitution at the highest tier of the production and the household sectors (i.e., elasticities of substitution between the primary factor composite and the aggregate intermediate input,crPFZ and elasticities of substitution between the capital-fuel composite and the labour-material-electricity composite, O-'(FI.'lEL) . In the sensitivity analysis, the values of ()PFZ and cr',FL,nl are increased by 50%. The results from this sensitivity analysis show that the ranking of d1e tax instruments in terms of d1eir welfare effects would not alter (please see Table 6 ). AssUU1ing that the in1pacts of carbon-, sulphur-and energy-tax instruments could be influenced by the elasticity of substitution between energy commodities (i.e., between fossil fuels, between electricity and fossil fuels), all the energy substitution elasticities considered in the study are increased by 100%. The energy substitution elasticities doubled here are: elasticity of substitution between electricity generated through different technologies (i.e., ()Hf, ()TH, ()s", and ()CG); elasticity of substitution between the fuel aggregate and electricity (i.e., ()FEL) and elasticity of substitution of between fuel commodities (i.e., ()H). The results of this sensitivity analysis also indicate that the ranking of the tax instrument remain intact.
In it could indicate whether or not superiority of sulphur tax over the carbon tax to reduce carbon emission holds, Interestingly, we found that the result does not hold, as the welfare loss of sulphur tax is higher (-0,96%) than that of carbon tax (-0,93%), This result indicates that a sulphur tax may not be efficient as compared to carbon tax to reduce CO, emission if the substitution possibilities between the high sulphur content fuels (e,g" coal) and low sulphur content fuel (e,g" natural gas) is smalL In reality, as discussed earlier in Section 4.2, the substitution possibility between coal and natural gas is high in Thailand even in the short-run, Finally, the trade elasticities (i,e" Armington elasticity, aD" and price elasticity of exports, 'Il) are increased by 100%, In this sensitivity analysis too, the ranking of the tax instruments does not change (please see Table 6 ),
CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REJ.I,lARKS
This study analyzed the effectiveness of carbon-, sulphur-, energy-and output-taxes for CO, emission reduction under different schemes of recycling the tax revenues in the case of Thailand, A key fmding of the study is that the selection between carbon-and sulphur-tax in order to reduce CO, emission depends on schemes for recycling tax revenues to the economy, The study shows that, in Thailand, a sulphur tax would be more effective to reduce CO, emission when the tax revenues are recycled to households through a lump-sum transfer for two reasons, First, the sulphur tax designed to reduce 10% of CO, emissions from the base case, would also result in 20% reductions of SO, emissions, Secondly, the sulphur tax would cause lower welfare loss than a carbon tax if there exists substitution possibility between high sulphur content fuel (coal) and negligible sulphur content fuel (e.g" natural ga,) in the short run. If the tax revenue were to recycle to households through a lump sum transfer. a SO, tax could be a policy choice in a country like Thailand, which does not have binding obligation to reduce CO, emission but has been seriously affected by SO, emission.
Another fmding of the study is that if tax revenues are recycled to finance cub in either labour tax rate or indirect tax rates on non-energy goods, carbon tax would be more efficient than sulphur-, energy-and output-taxes for CO, emission reductions, The outpW t:IX i, found to be the most costly (i.e., in welfare terms) among the alternative tax instnl11ll'nl' considered here under each of the tax revenue recycling schemes although it generates nn) t,) Ihree times higher revenue than the other tax instruments, While the fmding that the output tax is the most inefficient among the la, instruments considered could be a generic one, the result that shows a sulphur tax is more t-fticietlt Ihan a carbon tax to reduce CO, emission could be case specific, This would be true in till' econOI11\". where sulphur control technologies are not in use, where low quality coal (i.e .. lignile) is onc of the main sources of energy supply and where possibility of substitution ben\'een high sulphur content fuel (coal) and low sulphur content fuel (natural gas) is high e\'cn in the short run,
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